Ethiopia’s Digital Lifeline and Access to the sea : Reliance on Djibouti’s Submarine Cable Access(part 1)

Landlocked Connectivity and Fiber Optic Chokepoints

Landlocked countries like Ethiopia face unique challenges in accessing global Internet infrastructure. With no direct coast, Ethiopia cannot host its own submarine cable landing stations – instead, it must route international traffic through neighboring countries. This creates fiber optic chokepoints at border links and foreign landing stations, making reliable connectivity a strategic concern. For example, when two major submarine cables (SMW5 and AAE-1) were cut in the Mediterranean in 2022, Ethiopia experienced Internet disruptions despite the break occurring thousands of kilometers away . The reason: Ethiopia’s traffic was transiting through Djibouti Telecom and onward via the affected cables. Countries with diversified routes suffered less impact, whereas those dependent on a single pathway were hit hardest . This illustrates how critical these chokepoints are – a single cut or outage on an external route can severely affect a landlocked nation’s connectivity.

In the Horn of Africa, Djibouti has emerged as a regional Internet hub and primary conduit for Ethiopia’s international bandwidth. Djibouti’s strategic location at the Red Sea gateway has attracted numerous undersea cables – as of 2023, it hosts nine submarine cable landing points . For Ethiopia, this dense concentration of cables in Djibouti is both a boon and a vulnerability. It offers high-capacity links to Europe, Asia, and the rest of Africa, but Ethiopia’s dependence on Djibouti essentially concentrates its international access through a narrow funnel. Understanding the importance of these fiber chokepoints is crucial for Ethiopian policymakers, as they weigh how to secure the country’s digital future against outages, geopolitical pressures, and surging demand for connectivity.

Ethiopia’s Fiber Backbone and Djibouti Access Points

Ethiopia’s current fiber-optic backbone connects to the global Internet primarily via cross-border terrestrial links. The dominant route is through Djibouti, where Ethiopian networks tie into Djibouti’s cable landing stations. In fact, Ethiopia maintains fiber routes to Djibouti at two key border crossings (Galafi in the north and Ali Sabieh in the south) . These connections funnel data from Ethiopia’s core network to Djibouti Telecom’s facilities, granting Ethiopia access to multiple submarine cables (such as EASSy, SEA-ME-WE 5, AAE-1, and others) that land in Djibouti. Ethio Telecom – Ethiopia’s state-owned operator – effectively piggybacks on Djibouti’s nine undersea cables for international transit . Djibouti Telecom, in turn, peers with major global carriers (for example, Telecom Italia Sparkle, a co-owner of the SEA-ME-WE 5 cable) to reach Europe and Asia . This arrangement has given Ethiopia much-needed global connectivity without a coastline.

Beyond Djibouti, Ethiopia has made strides to establish additional fiber access points:

• Kenya: A fiber route runs south into Kenya, historically via Moyale (northern Kenya). This link was previously prone to outages, but a new high-capacity route has been deployed using optical ground wire (OPGW) along the regional power transmission line . In 2023, a private provider (Liquid Intelligent Technologies) launched a 1,000 km fully redundant fiber link between Nairobi and Ethiopia in partnership with Ethiopian and Kenyan electric utilities . This connection provides carrier-grade, multi-terabit capacity directly to Nairobi’s data centers, ensuring Ethiopia can access content hubs in Kenya and alternate submarine cables on Africa’s east coast. Importantly, it keeps regional traffic within Africa, reducing latency and reliance on more circuitous routes .
• Somalia (Somaliland): Ethiopia also interconnects with fiber networks in the Somaliland region (northwest Somalia) . A link from Ethiopia into Somaliland (e.g. near Togochale) allows access to SomCable’s network, which in 2022 secured the landing of the PEACE submarine cable in Berbera . Berbera’s new international cables – including a branch of the upcoming 2Africa cable consortium – present an alternative gateway. Once fully operational, this route will enable Ethiopian traffic to reach Europe and Asia via Somaliland’s coastal infrastructure, bypassing Djibouti.
• Sudan: To the west, a direct fiber link with Sudan has been limited in the past, but new initiatives are underway. In December 2024, Ethio Telecom, Sudatel (Sudan), and Djibouti Telecom signed an MoU for the “Horizon” Terrestrial Fiber Initiative . This project aims to build a multi-terabit land cable running Djibouti–Ethiopia–Sudan, which would interconnect with Sudan’s network northward to Europe and Asia. By linking the Horn of Africa to Sudan’s Red Sea coast (Port Sudan) and beyond, Ethiopia could gain another international outlet. The partners target service launch by April 2025, promising a redundant, low-latency route that reduces dependence on any single country .

Through these fiber backbone access points, Ethiopia is gradually evolving from a single-exit nation to one with multiple gateways. Still, Djibouti remains the principal hub for now – carrying an estimated majority of Ethiopia’s international traffic – thanks to historical ties and Djibouti’s head start in cable infrastructure. Ethio Telecom has partnership agreements to utilize Djibouti’s routes (and vice versa Djibouti benefits from transit revenue). However, as Ethiopia liberalizes its telecom sector (e.g. Safaricom Ethiopia’s entry) and data demands grow, the need for diversified access is greater than ever.

Vulnerabilities in a Single-Route Dependency

Relying predominantly on one corridor – Djibouti – for global connectivity – exposes Ethiopia to significant technical and geopolitical vulnerabilities. The most immediate risk is a network outage due to cable damage or technical failure along that corridor. Terrestrial fiber cables can be cut by accidents or conflict, and submarine cables are occasionally severed by ship anchors, undersea earthquakes, or even intentional sabotage. If a major cable cut occurs on the route that Djibouti and Ethiopia share, Ethiopia could experience a nationwide internet blackout or severe slowdown. In June 2022, for instance, simultaneous cuts to two Red Sea cables led to noticeable drops in Ethiopia’s internet traffic . Although service was restored within hours in that case, it underscored Ethiopia’s limited redundancy at the time – a more prolonged break could have knocked out connectivity for days. The World Bank has noted that Ethiopia’s primary Addis Ababa–Djibouti fiber route (along highways A1/A2) is potentially vulnerable due to conflict areas it traverses . Indeed, during recent internal unrest (e.g. the Tigray conflict 2020–2022), there were reports of fiber cuts affecting connectivity in northern Ethiopia, illustrating the fragility of routes that pass near conflict zones.

Another vulnerability is overreliance on a foreign intermediary. Djibouti effectively controls Ethiopia’s chief digital lifeline. This dependence could become a strategic liability if political relations were to deteriorate. While Ethiopia and Djibouti enjoy generally strong ties (anchored by Ethiopia’s heavy use of Djibouti’s seaport), any strain – for example, disputes over tariffs, transit fees, or alignment with foreign powers – might threaten service continuity or pricing. Djibouti’s monopoly on Ethiopia’s submarine access could also mean higher bandwidth costs. In fact, internet services in Djibouti itself are far less affordable than in Ethiopia , reflecting a lack of competition that could indirectly impact wholesale prices charged to Ethiopian carriers. A single-route setup also means single points of failure in infrastructure security: a cyber-attack, natural disaster, or sabotage targeting Djibouti’s landing stations would ripple directly into Ethiopia. The chokepoint could be exploited in a conflict scenario, effectively cutting off Ethiopia’s communications with the outside world.

Geopolitics further complicate the picture. Djibouti’s Red Sea coast is a hotspot of global interest – it hosts military bases of the United States, China, and others, and both superpowers have invested in Djibouti’s telecom sector . While this elevates Djibouti’s stability and capabilities, it also means Ethiopia’s internet is funneled through a location entangled in great-power competition. For example, Chinese firms (e.g. Huawei) built much of Djibouti’s ICT infrastructure , and a Chinese company is a key investor in the PEACE cable that lands in the region . U.S. interests are present via Djibouti Telecom’s partnerships as well. Ethiopian data traveling via Djibouti could theoretically be subject to external surveillance or influence by Djibouti’s partners. Moreover, Djibouti is keen to maintain its status as Ethiopia’s gateway; it watched warily as Somaliland’s Berbera port (and its new fiber cables) offer Ethiopia alternative access . In 2020, a diplomatic spat even arose when Djibouti claimed jurisdiction over an undersea cable segment to Berbera, underscoring how digital infrastructure can become a pawn in regional rivalries . Ethiopia must navigate these geopolitical undercurrents carefully to protect its digital sovereignty.

In sum, the current model – heavy dependence on one or two external routes – leaves Ethiopia exposed. Any disruption along the Djibouti corridor (be it technical, political, or security-related) would have outsized impact on Ethiopian society and economy. These vulnerabilities make a compelling case for Ethiopia to pursue greater network redundancy and autonomy.